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Abstract
Indigenous people in Panama do not enjoy full autonomy within theircomarcas(traditional land reserves):
they only control surface resources, while the state retains control of underground resources. This article
analyses direct action by the Ngäbe-Buglé, who successfully defeated the latest attempt by the government to
exploit underground resources within theircomarcas. It describes government strategies for retaining control
over Indigenous people’s land and analyses how the Ngäbe-Buglé counteracted these strategies with support
from burgeoning civil society movements. We argue that this is due to an unprecedented alliance between
Indigenous people and other social movements in Panama, as well as to the fact that Indigenous people have
succeeded in federating all major civil society organizations around their discourses and actions.
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The Ngäbe-Buglé number around 285,000 people and constitute 69% of all Indigenous people in 
Panama, who in turn make up 12% of the country’s total population (National Census, 2010). 
Despite impressive economic growth in Panama over the past 10 years and several governmental 
programs to redress their economic situation, Indigenous people remain poor and the Ngäbe-Buglé 
are the poorest of the poor (Nakoneczny & Whysner, 2010). 
The main struggle of Indigenous people in Panama has always centered on recognition of their land 
rights. As a result, comarcas have been created in Panama. A comarca is a large Indigenous territory 
protected by law. In all, there are five comarcas, which collectively cover 21% of Panama's total 
landmass (Herrera, 2012). Historically, the first comarca was created for the Guna people in 1938, 
after the bloody Guna rebellion (Valiente, 2002). The second comarca was created for the Embera 
in 1983. The Ngäbe-Buglé received their comarca in 1997, and this was followed by two further 
Guna comarcas. 
Indigenous people participate both in national and in local or Indigenous elections. In national 
elections, the Ngäbe-Buglé people elect three members of Parliament (diputados) as well as seven 
mayors (alcaldes) and 58 representatives (representantes de corregimiento) in their comarca. All of 
them belong to a political party and collaborate to administer the comarca in collaboration with a 
governor, who is also Ngäbe-Bugle and is appointed by the President of Panama. All these political 
actors are on the government payroll. In local and Indigenous elections, the Ngäbe-Buglé elects 
traditional authorities such as the caciques and presidents of congresses. The cacique is the head of 
the Indigenous executive body while the Congress represents the Indigenous legislative body. These 
individuals are the legal representatives of the people living in the comarca and are not affiliated to 
any political party; only the caciques are on the government payroll. Today, most of the real power 
lies in the hands of the governor, mayors, representatives, and members of Parliament; they receive 
funds from central government to manage all programs and infrastructural needs within the comarca. 
The traditional authorities are consulted, but they do not officially receive any budget from the 
national government.  
Comarcas are inalienable and imprescriptible land-holdings created for the exclusive use of 
Indigenous people. However, the state retains ownership of underground resources along with the 
right to authorize large-scale development projects such as hydroelectric dams and mining for the 
benefit of the whole nation (Ley 10, 1997; Tresierra, 1999; Wickstrom, 2003). As a result, it is 
unclear to what extent the state recognizes the authority of Indigenous communities over natural 
resources within the comarca (Ortiga, 2004). This creates much tension between the state, which 
has plans to exploit mineral resources, and Indigenous peoples, who would like to protect their 
natural resources and their livelihoods. 
This article is about the latest struggle of the Ngäbe-Buglé people to ban mining from their comarca. 
We will argue that this struggle was successful because of an unprecedented alliance between 
Indigenous people and other social movements in Panama over the protection of the environment 
itself instead of just focusing on Indigenous peoples' land rights.  
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The data on which this article is based come from a number of different sources. At the time of the 
conflict, we were conducting fieldwork in Panama with a neighbouring Indigenous group and closely 
followed national and international media coverage of the conflict. We also observed how the 
Ngäbe-Buglé protest was perceived both nationwide and by neighbouring Indigenous people and 
how they expressed their support for the struggle by creating roadblocks along the Pan-American 
Highway. We were also in close contact with an informant who was part of the Coordinadora por la 
Defensa de los Recursos Naturales y los Derechos del Pueblo Ngäbe-Buglé y Campesinos1 and with 
another informant who participated in the negotiations meetings. The first author, Rogelio Cansari 
Valdespino, is an Indigenous person with more than 15 years experience in the Dirección Nacional 
de Política Indígena, which is the national office for Indigenous affairs, and thus has access to key 
actors and information. This afforded us an insider’s perspective on the way this conflict was 
managed, as well as on the conflicts within the Indigenous movement. We further had access to 
many documents and working papers produced during negotiations between representatives of 
Indigenous peoples and the government. And finally, we analysed various official documents, such as 
relevant national laws and mining legislation (Código de Recursos Minerales), the report on the 
violation of human rights during the repression of the Indigenous protest (Bill, Arce, Wing, Lum, & 
DeLeon, 2012), the report of the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
People (Anaya, 2012), and official communications by global Indigenous networks in support of the 
Ngäbe-Buglé cause (e.g. Alianza Mesoamericana, 2012). 
  Chronology of Events   
The First Cerro Colorado Project 
In the early 1930s, copper was discovered on Cerro Colorado, a mountain that lies at the heart of 
what is today the Ngäbe-Buglé Comarca and, in 1955, a preliminary exploration concluded that 
Cerro Colorado contained significant copper reserves (Gjörding, 1991). When Colonel Omar 
Torrijos Herrera overthrew President Arnulfo Arias in 1968, his goal was to build a revolutionary 
Panamanian state endowed with full sovereignty, economically independent of the USA, and less 
dependent on the Panama Canal, which had dominated the economic and political life of the 
country since independence in 1903 (Gjörding, 1991; Pérez, 1998). Copper mining in Cerro 
Colorado soon became a key component of this vision. In addition, Torrijos also developed popular 
programs to help poor and Indigenous people (Gjörding, 1991). He frequently stressed that his 
government was the first in Panama’s history to respect Indigenous people, to devise and implement 
projects to improve their subsistence, and to provide them with the same services as those granted to 
other citizens, such as education and health care. Torrijos also promised Indigenous people a speedy 
recognition of land rights (in the form of comarcas). The Government sought to convince the 
Ngäbe-Buglé and the Panamanian population in general that the Cerro Colorado project would 
ensure a better future for everyone in Panama, including the Ngäbe-Buglé. The Government created 
the Mining Development Corporation (CODEMIN) in 1975 to exploit the Cerro Colorado copper 
deposits and to build hydroelectric dams in order to provide the energy required for copper mining. 
Indigenous people were not consulted but were promised that any loss would be fully compensated.  
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1 The Coordinadora is a coordinating group for the defense of natural resources and the rights of the Ngäbe-
Buglé people and of peasants. 
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of the process by opening roads to make the Cerro Colorado accessible for mining. The Ngäbe-
Buglé, who increasingly feared that they would be displaced by the project, organized a general 
congress to discuss the issue with the support of the Catholic Church. After debating the project in 
the General Congress, they decided to reject both the mining of the Cerro Colorado and the 
hydroelectric projects and they demanded full participation in negotiations concerning the project 
(Gjörding, 1991). Above all, they wanted their territory to be recognised as a comarca. Torrijos, 
however, refused to grant their lands comarca status unless they: (a) approved the referendum on 
the Torrijos-Carter canal treaties, (b) supported the creation of Torrijos’ new political party (PRD), 
and (c) supported the Cerro Colorado project. The Ngäbe-Buglé complied with the two first 
conditions but remained critical of the Cerro Colorado project and were determined to protect their 
land, despite the fact that some caciques entertained good relations with Torrijos and backed his 
plans (Gjörding, 1991). The Government continued to prevaricate regarding land recognition and, 
ultimately, the Cerro Colorado project was put on hold for various reasons: the political void left by 
Torrijos’ death in 1981, the complexity of the project, decreasing global copper prices, and the 
opposition of the Ngäbe-Buglé people (Zea cited in Simms & Moolji, 2011; Wickstrom, 2001). The 
Cerro Colorado today lies within the Ngäbe-Buglé Comarca, which was finally created in 1997, and 
it remains one of the world’s largest proven untapped copper reserves (Simms & Moolji, 2011). 
Both government interest in copper and the Ngäbe-Buglé opposition to mining remained high: by 
the end of the 1990s, 80% of the Ngäbe-Buglé Comarca was covered by mining applications that did 
not have the consent of the Ngäbe-Buglé people. By 2011, 13 multinational companies had 
expressed an interest in exploiting the Cerro Colorado site (Simms & Moolji, 2011; Young & Bort, 
1999). As world copper prices began to rise at the turn of the 21st century, reaching a historical high 
in 2011, pressure to mine the copper increased and the Government started revising the law to 
facilitate mining. In 2003, the Government used a technique known as madrugonazos (legislation 
votes at dawn) to repeal a number of key statutes of the Environment General Law (Ley 41, 1998).  
The statutes that were repealed were those that recognized Indigenous people’s right to use and 
manage natural resources in their lands and comarcas, that required authorization for the industrial 
and commercial use of Indigenous resources and agreement with Indigenous representatives for any 
project on Indigenous land, and that necessitated obtaining prior consent before Indigenous people 
could be relocated. There was no process of consultation with interest groups such as Indigenous 
people and no media coverage of the events (Runk, 2012). 
Reform of the Mining Code 
In June 2010, the President of South Korea visited Panama and met with Ricardo Martinelli, a 
successful businessman elected as President of Panama in 2009. On February 10, 2011, the 
Government approved the reform of the 1963 mining code by 44 votes to 15, which subsequently 
became Law 8, signed by President Martinelli (Ley 8, 2011). This reform provoked wide-scale 
protest and opposition. First, the population perceived it as violating the Panamanian Constitution 
in that it allowed the exploitation of national resources by multinational companies. Second, 
journalists revealed that the President of South Korea had been discussing the mining issue in June 
with President Martinelli, expressing his satisfaction about the proposed revision of the mining code 
and reiterating that South-Korean companies were willing to increase their investments in Panama. 
This provoked questions among protesters regarding the extent to which President Martinelli had 
changed the law to satisfy South Korean interests (“Gobierno confirma,” 2011). Third, many 
Indigenous people opposed the new mining code because they had not been consulted and because 
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these protests because they feared that the new law would pave the way for copper mining in the 
Cerro Colorado. 
To show their opposition to the reform, union members, students, environmentalists, and 
Indigenous peoples carried out a nationwide protest that ultimately forced the Government to 
repeal the law. The protest started on February 7, 2011 with groups of students, union members, and 
environmentalists demonstrating in Panama City and Indigenous people blockading stretches of the 
Pan-American Highway (until they were forcibly removed by the police). After Law 8 was passed in 
the face of widespread opposition, road blockades and protests intensified across the country. It took 
about one week for the Ngäbe-Buglé to organize, but on February 15, they mobilized on a large scale 
and blockaded the Pan-American Highway in San Felix. From then on, the Ngäbe-Buglé took the 
lead in the protests, supported by students, labour unions and environmentalists, as well as by the 
Catholic Church, which called for peaceful dialogue. 
The strategy of the protesters was fourfold. First, Indigenous people, together with students, 
teachers, labor unions and environmentalists, organized several demonstrations in Panama City, 
targeting the South Korean Embassy and the National Assembly. Second, they lodged an appeal in 
the Supreme Court on the grounds that the new mining law violated the country’s Constitution. 
Third, Indigenous people blockaded the Pan-American Highway and continuously re-established 
blockades after they were forcibly removed. Fourth, Indigenous people disavowed any Indigenous 
authorities who called for an end to the protests and organised themselves around an independent 
and civil coordinadora.  
The government adopted three main strategies. First, they sent police to clear road blockades (as on 
February 18 in Pacora or on February 25 in San Felix and 12 different road blockades). Second, 
because the government believed that foreigners were behind the protest (“Arrestos y,” 2011), the 
Minister of the Interior gave two weeks notice to all foreigners (including journalists) to leave the 
Ngäbe-Buglé Comarca. Third, the government tried to “divide and rule” in order to take advantage 
of latent divisions that exist in any movement (Colloredo-Mansfeld, 2009) by making deals with 
Indigenous representatives who were susceptible to co-optation. For example, on February 21, the 
Government surprised everybody by announcing that it had been negotiating with Rogelio Moreno, 
the then cacique of the Ngäbe-Buglé, and that they had reached an agreement that no mining in 
Indigenous territories would happen during President Ricardo Martinelli’s term of office. The 
President signed this decree into law the very next day to show that he was committed to keeping his 
word and then Cacique Moreno called for an end to the protests. But this deal outraged protesters, 
who did not want any agreement made behind their backs and wanted a total and permanent repeal 
of the law. As a consequence, when the Ngäbe-Buglé held their General Congress in March 2011, 
Cacique Moreno was strongly renounced - called a traitor to the Ngabé-Buglé cause and declared 
persona non grata in the comarca. The Ngabé-Buglé even detained him for two days, binding his 
hands. However, the internal division within the Ngäbe-Buglé did not prevent further action and 
may even have further radicalized protesters. 
Finally, the Government agreed to mediated talks with the Coordinadora. The road blockades were 
suspended and negotiations were started between the government commission and the 
Coordinadora, which were mediated Catholic Church. They reached an agreement on February 27 
and, as a result, Law 12 was voted in to repeal Law 8 (Ley 12, 2011). The Trade and Economic 
Affairs Commission of the National Assembly presented a new bill (Bill 415) proposing a special 
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Bill (Proyecto de Ley 415, 2011) included Article 5, stating that: 
All valid concessions granted to national or foreign corporations for the exploration or 
exploitation of mineral resources and for the construction of hydroelectric projects within 
the comarca, appended areas and in Ngäbe-Buglé communities outside the comarca are 
hereby cancelled, and all ongoing work by such corporations is hereby suspended forthwith 
[our translation].  
The Fight for Article 5 
However, when the Bill was voted on at the commission level on January 25, 2012 and was proposed 
as a new law to be discussed in the Assembly, Article 5 had been removed. The new formal Congress 
representatives, who had been elected in March 2011 (after the provisional agreement with the 
government), had complained that Article 5 had not been discussed within the Ngäbe-Buglé 
Congress and was therefore illegitimate. This allowed the Trade Commission to remove Article 5 
from the Bill. The Trade Commission took advantage of the fact that the Ngäbe-Buglé people were 
divided. The presidency of the General Congress and the post of General Cacique have been the 
object of constant struggles between different Indigenous factions for more than 10 years (Ellington, 
Lino, & Cansari, 2009; HREV, 2010). In an attempt to put an end to the internal struggle and 
competing claims to the presidency, the National Electoral Tribunal organized the elections for the 
first time in comarca history. But this was contested by a large number of Ngäbe-Buglé, who felt that 
the government was trying to influence the outcome of the election and who organized a 
simultaneous parallel election following traditional procedure. As a result, in 2011, there were two 
separate heads of Congress: Edilberto Sánchez, who was formally elected according to the law and 
while under the supervision of the state was officially recognized by the Government, and Celio 
Guerra, who had been “traditionally” elected but who had no official recognition from central 
government.  
While formally elected Congress members sided with the government and supported the new bill 
without Article 5, traditionally elected Congress members and the Coordinadora defended inclusion 
of the Article. Upon learning of the intention to remove Article 5, the Coordinadora addressed a 
letter to President Martinelli on January 22, complaining about the prevaricatory tactics of 
commission members and collusion with the officially elected President of the Ngäbe-Buglé 
Congress while warning that they would protest and blockade the Pan-American Highway if Article 
5 was removed from the new bill. Three days later, the Bill was passed in the Trade Commission of 
the National Assembly without Article 5 and, on January 30, the Ngäbe-Buglé people resumed 
protests and blockaded several strategically sensitive stretches of the Pan-American Highway, with 
San Felix as the epicentre of their action. This time, the Coordinadora received the support of the 
new General Cacica Silvia Carrera, who had been elected in September 2011. Silvia Carrera came to 
act as the movement’s main spokesperson. 
The blockade lasted about a week and had a major impact on the national economy because it 
affected communication and transport from the northern side of the country down to Panama City. 
The whole country was effectively paralyzed, posing an urgent problem for the government, which 
responded by establishing a puente aéreo (air bridge) to transport people and food from David City, 
near San Felix, to Panama City using large aircraft normally flown on international routes. On 
February 4, the Government shut down all telephone and e-mail communications in the entire 
region of San Felix. Around 5 a.m. the following morning, the police brutally and without warning 
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killing one protester, wounding 32 (one of whom later also died), and arresting 40 people, including 
women and children (Bill et al., 2012). This only served to further radicalize the protesters who 
overran the police station in El Volcán and burnt it to the ground; by late afternoon, traffic on the 
Pan-American Highway had been reopened. However, over the following days (and for the entire 
duration of the conflict), the road was sporadically blockaded at various points, not just by the 
Ngäbe-Buglé but also by other Indigenous people from all over the country. Panamanian 
environmentalists, teachers, students, and labor unions organized demonstrations nationwide in 
solidarity with the Ngäbe-Buglé cause. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNHCHR) Special Rapporteur wrote to the President of Panama setting out his 
concerns regarding the removal of Article 5 from the new mining bill (Anaya, 2012). On February 7, 
with the mediation of the Catholic Bishop of Chiriquí, government representatives, and Ngäbe-
Buglé leaders met and signed the San Lorenzo Agreement. One of the 10 clauses in the agreement 
asked the President of the Trade Commission to re-include Article 5 in Bill 415. Negotiations began 
the following day.  
Throughout the negotiations, the government was represented by the Minister of Trade, the 
Minister of the Interior, the National Environmental Authority (ANAM), the Public Services 
Authority (ASEP), and the Secretaría de Energía de la Presidencia (Presidential Energy Office). The 
Ngäbe-Buglé were represented by Cacica Silvia Carrera, Rogelio Montezuma from the 
Coordinadora, and eight other members of the comarca. No Congress members (either from the 
formal or the traditional Congress) took part in the negotiations. Although the formal President of 
the Ngäbe-Buglé General Congress, Edilberto Sánchez, repeatedly tried to join the negotiating panel 
(“Otros líderes,” 2012), the Coordinadora refused to include him because he had played a role in the 
removal of Article 5 and was trying to be put on the government payroll (a fact that was confirmed 
by an official from the Department of Indigenous Affairs). He was therefore identified as siding with 
government interests.  
The negotiations lasted for more than 40 days, going through a variety of phases and giving rise to 
numerous incidents. Over the course of the negotiations, the Pan-American Highway was 
intermittently blockaded and demonstrations by Indigenous and non-Indigenous people took place 
both in Panama City and in provincial towns, as well as in front of the National Assembly and 
Presidential Palace. During the demonstrations, the Ngäbe-Buglé, dancing to the beat of maracas, 
chanted “ñankare! la Comarca no se vende, la Comarca se defiende, este pueblo no se vende” (No 
way! The Comarca cannot be bought, the Comarca will resist, this people cannot be bought).  
The negotiators quickly agreed to close the CODEMIN and to abolish Law 41 of 1975 that allowed 
for the exploitation of the Cerro Colorado, to cancel two planned hydroelectric dams, Caño Clarito 
and Chorcha, and to reinsert Article 5 in the new mining bill. But when the Ngäbe-Buglé tried to 
include other hydroelectric projects (such as the Barro Blanco project) that had already begun and 
that will flood part of the Ngäbe-Bugle customary land, the government refused, arguing that the 
projects fell outside the remit of the San Lorenzo agreement. Nevertheless, negotiations centered on 
the hydroelectric projects and the rewriting of Article 5.  
On March 15 at midnight, the Commission finally reached a two-part agreement. First, the group 
working on Article 5 of Bill 415 agreed on a new draft:  
a.  Cancelling all mining concessions in the comarca;  
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of the comarca;  
c.  Requiring that all future hydroelectric projects in the comarca should give a minimum of 
5% of annual profit to the comarca, to be administered by the General Congress and to 
be used for agriculture, water, education, health, and the strengthening of traditional 
institutions, and that at least 25% of personnel should be drawn from the Ngäbe-Buglé 
community; 
d.  Requesting that any people forced to move as a result of the dam project be given 
compensation in advance and be relocated to land of comparable quality;  
e.  Protecting the traditional and sustainable use of Ngäbe-Buglé natural resource in 
collaboration with the National Authority for the Environment;  
f.  Abolishing Law 41 of 1975 (and thereby cancelling any mining in Cerro Colorado).  
Second, the group discussing hydroelectric projects agreed:  
a.  To revise the environmental impact assessment of the Barro Blanco hydroelectric dam; 
b.  To set up a working group to verify that three hydroelectric dams (Chan 75, Tabasara II 
and Chan II) had complied with the agreement and paid proper compensation to 
indigenous people;  
c.  To create a special commission including representatives of ANATI (National Land 
Authority), ANAM (National Environmental Authority), and the Ministry of Interior, 
which handles Indigenous affairs, to verify illegal trespassing by colonos on Indigenous 
land; and  
d.  To create a roundtable to discuss national plans for Indigenous development.  
The Cacica and the Coordinadora, who had always maintained permanent contact with people 
during the conflict, reported back to “the people” (Indigenous people, teacher’s unions, local 
leaders) to explain the new agreement. Their report caused discontent among some radical 
Indigenous people2 who wanted to remove all existing hydroelectric dams, but was generally well 
received by others, and the remaining road blockades were removed. On March 22, the National 
Assembly approved Bill 415 of 2011, establishing a special regime for the protection of the mineral, 
water, and environmental resources of the Ngäbe-Buglé Comarca, which later became Law 11 of 
2012 (Ley 11, 2012). 
Discussion 
Indigenous people have long been seen as doomed either to extinction or to assimilation in 
mainstream society. However, the present demographic growth of Indigenous people and their 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2 Radical is here understood as unwilling to accept anything less than a total ban on mining and electric dams, 
including those already well underway, which makes such demands rather unrealistic. We do not mean to say 
“radical” in the sense of a “racist, culturally intolerant extremist” movement, as it is sometimes used in an 
Andean context (Hale, 2002, p. 491). 
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Starn, 2007; Warren & Jackson, 2002). Today, we are witnessing a striking reversal in how 
Indigenous people are perceived since “in the early twenty-first century, few would disagree that 
[Indigenous movements] are among the most important social actors in the struggles over the future 
of Latin American Democracies” (Postero & Zamosc, 2004, p. 1).  
The focus of the present article has been on Indigenous mobilization against mining. 
Transformations in the structure of the global mining industry over the past 25 years, coupled with 
advances in technology and the strong trend toward liberalization and privatization, has opened up 
enormous new regions for exploration and development by transnational mining companies. This 
has inevitably brought mining companies into conflict with Indigenous communities, both in Latin 
America (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Szablowski, 2002; Whiteman & Mamen, 2002) and elsewhere (Ali, 
2009). As the cumulative social and environmental impacts of mining are important, Indigenous 
people resist these projects through a variety of strategies, ranging from lawsuits to community 
mobilization and protest (Barber, 2008, Nakoneczny & Whysner, 2010; Urkidi & Walter, 2011; 
Whiteman & Mamen 2002). For example, there have been major conflicts between the mining 
industry and Indigenous people in Peru (Bebbington, Bebbington, Bury, Lingan, & Muñoz, 2008; 
García & Lucero, 2004), Colombia (Rathgeber, 2004), Chile (Postero & Zamosc, 2004; Tomaselli, 
2012; Urkidi & Walter, 2011), Bolivia (Nash, 1989), Argentina (Giarracca, 2006; Urkidi & Walter, 
2011), and Ecuador (Bebbington, Bebbington, et al., 2008). 
However, there are two characteristics that make the Ngäbe-Buglé case different from many of the 
conflicts mentioned above. First, social movements in Latin America are atypical, unfolding in 
different geographical and political contexts. Bebbington, Bebbington, et al. (2008) distinguish 
between two types of social movement. On the one hand, some social movements fight against 
“accumulation by exploitation” in order to expand people’s asset base. This is the case with 
historically generated labor movements, trade unions, and related political organizations. On the 
other hand, social movements can also emerge to fight against “accumulation by dispossession” as 
with the privatization of land and water. These “new” social movements, such as the one described in 
this article, are usually centered around land and minority rights. In Panama, the Ngäbe-Buglé 
movement is built on communitarian identities and is therefore more “traditionalist” (see 
Bebbington, Abramovay & Chiriboga, 2008). Unlike Indigenous movements in the Andes, which 
are often about social and environmental justice, anti-colonial or social class struggles (Lucero, 
2008; Nash, 1989; Thomson, 2002; Urkidi & Walter, 2011; Veltmeyer, 1997), the Ngäbe-Buglé 
movement is more about the autonomy of the Indigenous territory and the protection of Indigenous 
culture. It is therefore closer to Amazonian Indigenous movements that also articulate their struggle 
around some form of land reserve (comarcas and tierras colectivas in Panama, resguardo in 
Columbia, terras indígenas in Brazil, for example). Second, unlike most of the conflicts mentioned 
above, the Ngäbe-Buglé conflict is not about an existing mining operation (the mitigation of 
environmental impacts or the redistribution of benefits), but rather about preventing and outlawing 
future mining within the comarca. The conflict is therefore not with a specific mining company but 
rather with the government. 
Van Cott (2001, 2004) argued that renewed claims for Indigenous autonomy are triggered by: (a) 
neoliberal economic policies threatening the land of Indigenous communities, (b) United Nations’ 
efforts to secure Indigenous people’s rights, and (c) an alliance between Indigenous organizations 
and other social movements (see also Rodrigues, 2002). The conflict between the Ngäbe-Buglé and 
the Panamanian government fits well into this analysis. First, the conflict was triggered by neo-liberal 
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activity (see also Bellinger & Arce, 2011).  
Second, the presence of a special rapporteur from the United Nations helped put pressure on the 
government to negotiate, even though this factor was probably not decisive. The additional fact that 
the national media provided a full and critical coverage of the Ngäbe-Buglé movement and its violent 
repression, which was relatively new in the media history of Panama, and that this information was 
relayed by the international media, probably had more impact in terms of putting pressure on the 
Panamanian government.  
Third, Indigenous people have demonstrated previously, have blockaded the Pan-American 
Highway and have achieved important results (the creation of the comarcas being the most 
significant of these). They have been Fighting Like a Community (Colloredo-Mansfeld, 2009), 
alone and against others, adopting a “closed form of self-governance” focusing on Indigenous rights 
(Bebbington, Abramova, et al., 2008, p. 2881). This time, however, indigenous people joined forces 
with other civil movements to reach common environmental and democratic goals. Thus, the 
Coordinadora fought for the defense of the rights of the Ngäbe-Buglé and peasants (campesinos), 
and explicitly included non-Indigenous people. But the alliance went far beyond these campesinos 
and also included environmentalists, teachers, workers, and students. Moreover, whereas Indigenous 
movements used to fight for their specific land rights, in this case, they were also fighting for 
environmental goals (a trend that can also be seen in other Latin American countries, see Assies, 
2009; Giarraca, 2006; Soliz, 2012), as well as for broader democratic ones. The alliance was not only 
concerned with protecting environmental resources, but also with respect for the constitution, 
democracy, and human rights. The new mining code was attacked in court on the ground that it was 
anti-constitutional; Cacica Silvia Carrera threatened to call on the Organization of American States 
to investigate human rights violations in the violent repression of the Ngäbe-Buglé demonstrations 
(Suarez Toro, 2012), and four civil rights organizations joined forces to produce a report on human 
rights violation during the repression of the demonstrations (Bill et al., 2012). Opposition to 
President Martinelli’s plan to change the mining code and allow South Korean interests to mine the 
Cerro Colorado was so widespread in all layers of Panamanian society that various civil society 
movements with diverse foci (self-determination and the right to be consulted for the Ngäbe-Buglé, 
preservation of biodiversity for environmentalists, respect for the Constitution and preservation of 
the national interest for unions), ended up joining forces to oppose it.  
Lucero (2008) argued that Indigenous movements represent a democratizing force in contemporary 
Latin America. This is certainly the case in Panama, but what is striking in the present case is that 
Indigenous people emerged as the most active component of a cluster of interest groups fighting for 
the protection of the environment and democratic consultation in the country. The Ngäbe-Buglé 
came to be seen as the leading actors in the defense of the national interest, which made them 
immensely popular and garnered very broad support from other civil society organisations and from 
the media. The Indigenous slogan, “ñankare!” or “ñagare!”as it is spelled in the national media, 
means “no way” in the Ngäbe-Buglé language and has today become part of the national vocabulary. 
It can now also be heard in non-Indigenous demonstrations about unrelated social or political 
differences with the government. Other non-Indigenous groups are now taking the Ngäbe-Buglé 
movement as example when organising protests against the government. Indigenous people have 
also become keen to support non-Indigenous social movements. For example, in Colon Province, 
where black communities are fighting for the abolition of Law 72, which allows the government to 
sell land in the Free Zone, Cacica Silvia Carrera expressed public support for their cause, threatening 
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During the conflict about the mining code, Cacica Silvia Carrera became an iconic figure for the 
Indigenous movement and she is increasingly recognized as the spokesperson not only of 
Indigenous people, but also of Panamanian civil society as a whole. For example, on January 12, 
2013, 20 Panamanian civil society organizations (associations of black communities, Indigenous 
communities, teachers, ecologists, plantation workers, farmers, labor unions, the Coordinadora 
against mining, etc.), calling themselves “Alianza Estratégica” and fighting against so-called “mega-
projects” (megaproyectos), chose Silvia Carrera as the coordinator and spokesperson of the alliance. 
Indigenous people in Panama have thus acquired a unique position as leaders of a coalition of civil 
rights and environmental movements, which is a surprising achievement, given their minority and 
marginal status in Panama. 
Conclusion 
The Ngäbe-Buglé’s success in their fight against mining in the Cerro Colorado is quite remarkable 
and has repercussions that reach far beyond the issue of mining. Indigenous people in Panama, as 
elsewhere in Latin America, are emerging as permanent players on the political stage (Van Cott, 
2004, 2007; Yashar, 1999), and far from losing momentum (as predicted by Van Cott, 2009), they 
continue to gain in strength in terms of influencing policy making. But in Panama, the Ngäbe-Buglé 
have gone further: in that they have shifted from being one player among others to becoming the key 
or central player, federating all major civil society organisations around their discourses and actions. 
A broad national alliance with progressive political forces fighting for a common national interest 
may prove to be the best way to influence Indigenous policy.  
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